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NOTES AND COMMENTS
department is busily putting limited access signs on many of our newer
highways.34  Either the highway department is proceeding under a con-
viction that power to designate limited access highways is implied in
the general grant of powers to that department, a conviction which
hardly seems tenable, when we consider our court's traditional solici-
tude for individual rights,35 or the North Carolina highway department
is making an attempt to bluff abutters into a belief that they have lost
rights which have, in fact, always been theirs. Let us hope that if these
acts are tested in the courts, as they should be, the commission will
be able to offer convincing evidence of its authority to designate Limited
Access Highways in North Carolina.
HAMILTON C. HORTON, JR.
Torts-Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law-A Threat to
Stare Decisis
In broad daylight the plaintiff-pedestrian, who had looked both
ways and had seen no vehicle approaching, started across the open
highway and was struck by defendant-motorist eighteen inches from the
other side; the motorist was traveling only twenty to twenty-five miles
per hour and the plaintiff had clear visibility for 700 feet. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that he
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.' Judge Bobbitt, dis-
senting,2 thought that there was more reason for submitting this case
to the jury than there was in the similar case of Williams v. Hender-
son,3 because more evidence of due care was shown here. The principal
case attempted to distinguish the Williams case, 4 but did not seem to
Chapel Hill.) an inquiry as to the authority under which the Commission was
constructing Limited Access Highways.
"Typical are those erected on the Durham-Chapel Hill highway: "Limited
Access Highway. Entrance by permit only. S. H. & P. W. C."
"The Minnesota Court, in Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d
394 (1945), reviews the question of whether statutory authority is necessary
and tabulates those states which are with and those without statutes. That
court found a statute unnecessary, construing the general grant of power to de-
termine what "land" to acquire, to include all interests growing out of land,
including easements of access. The great majority of states, however, obviously
felt a specific statute necessary: e.g., ILLINOIS ANNO. STAT. c. 121 § 334 et seq.
(Supp. 1954); ANNO. LAWS OF MASS. C. 81 § 7c (1953); N. Y. CODE ANNO.
c. 248 § 30.4 (1937); OHio GEN. CODE § 1178-21 (Page 1946); ORE. LAws
c. 226 § 14 (1947).
'Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954).
2 Id. at 418, 85 S. E. 2d at 593.
8230 N. C. 707, 55 S. E. 2d 462 (1949). Plaintiff's intestate crossed the open
highway to go to her mail box. As she was standing at the box with her back
to the road two trucks were approaching, the second following the first at a short
distance. The first truck passed and she turned suddenly and walked in front
of the second truck. The court held that intestate was not contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law.
'Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 416, 85 S. E. 2d 589, 592: "'Here the
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succeed. In effect, it seems that the Williams case was overruled, or
at least restricted to its own peculiar facts.
In looking at other cases in this area disharmony is also found.a
It seems that the phrase "contributory negligence as a matter of law"
is readily applied to justify opposite results in cases with similar facts.
According to a recent writer, the phrase "explains nothing and succeeds
only in creating an aura of mystery about the entire decision."
defendant was operating his heavily loaded truck at 45 to 50 miles per hour
within 150 feet of the vehicle just ahead. As the road was straight he saw or
should have seen the deceased on the shoulder of the highway, standing at the
mail box before the first truck passed her. She had her back to him and was ap-
parently oblivious to his approach. Yet he did not slacken his speed or apply
his brakes or sound his horn. These circumstances present a case for the jury.'"
One would think that being "oblivious" while crossing a highway would be
contributory negligence as a matter of law; here deceased's oblivion was the
very thing that got plaintiff's case to the jury. It seems, therefore, that the
only way to reconcile the Garnon and Williams cases is to think in terms of
last clear chance for the Williams case.
' The following cases held that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law: Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954). Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954). Wife of plaintiff stopped at
the intersection as she was coming out of a servient road and after seeing de-
fendant-motorist approaching from her right about a block away she changed to
low gear and went across the intersection at a speed of five miles per hour and
did not again look to her right or hear anything until the impact. Singletary v.
Nixon, 239 N. C. 634, 80 S. E. 2d 676 (1954). Plaintiff's lights and brakes were
adequate when he ran into the defendant truck-trailer as it was backing off the
road into a terminus. Johnson v. Heath, 240 N. C. 255, 81 S. E. 2d 657 (1954).
Plaintiff who had allegedly never seen the mule drove his automobile into same
on a bright moonlight night without slackening his pace or turning to the left
when there was nothing in the left lane to prevent such. Sheldon v. Childers,
240 N. C. 449, 82 S. E. 2d 396 (1954). Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that
he was driving his automobile about 50 miles per hour, following defendant's
tractor-trailer, and when he was about 400 feet to the rear of defendant's ve-
hicle, with a clear view ahead, he blew his horn and turned into the left lane
to pass, and when he was about 200 feet behind the tractor-trailer, it pulled
into the left lane to enter a dirt road on its left and stopped, blocking all but
about two and one-half feet of hard surface on plaintiff's left and about five
feet of hard surface and six feet of shoulder level with the pavement on plain-
tiff's right over which he could have passed. Plaintiff applied his brakes, and
there were skid marks for 157 feet before his automobile hit the trailer and
stopped.
The following cases held that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law: Williams v. Henderson, 230 N. C. 707, 55 S. E. 2d 462 (1949).
Hamilton v. Henry, 239 N. C. 664, 80 S. E. 2d 485 (1954). Plaintiff-motorist,
after looking and seeing no other vehicles, slowed down to twenty miles per
hour as he entered an intersection. After getting inside the intersection he saw
defendant-motorist coming at him to his left about 100 feet away at the rate of
about 50 miles per hour, and the left front of defendant's vehicle crashed into
the left rear of plaintiff's vehicle as plaintiff's vehicle was two-thirds of the way
across the intersection. There was some evidence that just prior to the collision
defendant had been looking out of his side window. (Note the similarity be-
tween this case and the Garnon case, and the fact that the plaintiff in the Garmnon
case was almost across the highway.) Goodson v. Williams, 237 N. C. 291, 74
S. E. 2d 762 (1953). Defendant-motorist struck deceased pedestrian just before
deceased had cleared the hard surface on defendant's right. just before the
collision defendant had met another car whose headlights had blinded him, and
defendant did not see deceased until he was about five feet away. Bryant v.
Watford. 240 N. C. 333, 81 S. E. 2d 926 (1954). Defendant stopped his truck
on the highway at night witnout lights and plaintiff-motorist ran into back of the
truck.Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 138, 142 (1954).
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Courts have no trouble with the general rule, for that is established
beyond doubt.7 The real problem of the court is determined whether
or not more than one reasonable inference as to negligence may be
drawn from the facts. Courts in any jurisdiction that still retains con-
tributory negligence as a defense have trouble at this point ;8 whereas,
jurisdictions that have comparative negligence have no such problem.9
The "reasonable deductions" or "reasonable inferences" that may be
drawn from a given set of facts will naturally vary, for such reasoning
is subjective in nature-although the objective "reasonable man" is the
ultimate criterion. It would take one with divine omniscience to explain
why a certain inference is the only permissible one the "reasonable
man" would draw in a given case. Split decisions in this area indicate
that judges disagree as to when only one inference may be drawn.'0
"65 C. J. S. § 251 (3) at 1126; DEERING, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 12 (1886)
BARROWs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, 35 (1900) : "Nor should the
court withdraw the case from the jury for the reason that to its mind the facts
were so weak as to give no support to the proposition of negligence, either of
plaintiff or defendant. The question is, rather, are the facts so weak in the esti-
mate of fair, sound minds, that the law would not tolerate a verdict founded
upon them. If but one inference can be drawn from the evidence, it, is, of
course, purely a question of law for the decision of the court." SAL2,MoND, THE
LAW OF TORTS 38 (1924). Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589
(1954). Bartek v. Grossman, 365 Pa. 522, 52 A. 2d 209 (1947). Sargent v.
Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S. W. 2d 787 (1953).
' Bartek v. Grossman, 365 Pa. 522, 52 A. 2d 209 (1947), commented on in
Note, 21 TEmp. L. Q. 66 (1947). Prospective lessee followed defendant's agent
into a dark room to inspect the house he was thinking about renting and fell
into a trap door, held, contributory negligence as a matter of law. Gills v. New
York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 342 Ill. 455, 174 N. E. 523 (1930), commented on in
Note, 26 ILL. L. REv. 453 (1931). Plaintiff-motorist waited for the eastward
train to pass, and then proceeded across the tracks where he was struck by a
westward train along the outer track which train had given no warning, held,
no contributory negligence as a matter of law: since where there is any evidence
which tends to show the use of due care, the question of contributory ngligence
is one for the jury. Sargent v. Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S. W. 2d 787
(1953), commented on in Notes, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 391 (1954) and 32 TEx. L.
REv. 469 (1954). Two girls, aged 13 and 14, voluntarily rode with a 13 year
old boy, who drove 110 miles per hour, and who had a reputation for reckless-
ness, held, the girls were contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See strong
dissent. 152 Tex. 413, 422, 258 S. W. 2d 787, 791.
'Jurisdictions that have abolished contributory negligence as a defense and
now have comparative negligence simply submit the case to the jury, in every
instance, and let the jury determine what percentage of the total damage was
attributable to the negligence of the respective litigants. See Note, 24 N. Z. L. J.
300 (1948). For a suggested comparative negligence law for North Carolina
see: Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina 11 N. C. L. REV. 51, 52, 59(1932). Such a statute has been introduced a number of times before the North
Carolina General Assembly, the last time being in 1953, and has always been
defeated.
o The following are some of the recent split-decisions: Garmon v. Thomas,
241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 589 (1954) ; Winfield v. Smith, 230 N. C. 392. 53 S. E.
2d 251 (1949) ; McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator Co., 230 N. C. 539, 54 S. E. 2d
45 (1949) ; Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N. C. 481, 67 S. E. 2d 664 (1951) ; Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954) ; Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N. C.
634, 80 S. E. 2d 676 (1954); Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608
(1940); Bartek v. Grossman, 365 Pa. 522, 52 A. 2d 209 (1947); Sargent v.
Williams, 152 Tex. 413, 258 S. W. 2d 787 (1953).
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At one time the court would automatically declare plaintiff con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law when he "outran his head-
lights."'" This was called the "mathematical rule" or "mathematical
formula."'1 2  In effect, the "mathematical rule" said that contributory
negligence is the only inference that may be drawn where plaintiff
"outran his headlights." There was opposition to the "rule" in the
courts,1 3 and writers were critical of it. 1 4  In 1953 the General Assem-
bly saw fit to abolish the "mathematical rule" by amending G. S.
§ 20-141.1r
The "mathematical rule" as applied to "outrunning headlights"
cases was commendable in that litigants would know what the court
would hold once it was established that plaintiff had been "outrunning
his headlights." But the obvious fallacy to such a rule is that there
may be "outrunning headlights" situations in which the plaintiff is not
guilty of contributory negligence. Such being true, the "rule" clearly
violates the single inference idea. By nature, then, it seems that the
rule of "contributory negligence as a matter of law" defies any such
restrictions as the "mathematical formula."
Failure to yield the right of way on the open highway has been held
not to be contributory negligence per se,16 and contributory negligence
of the pedestrian is not presumed from the mere fact that he is killed.' 7
Therefore, it seems that anything like the "mathematical rule" is ex-
cluded from this area.
Rules such as the "mathematical formula" have been applied to
other areas. In the famous case of Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Good-
1 Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608 (1940). See also Tyson
v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251 (1948); Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C. 155, 52
S. E. 2d 355 (1949); and Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N. C. 377, 64 S. E. 2d 276(1951).1 Notes, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948) and 31 N. C. L. Rxv. 412, 415 (1953).
1" Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 115, 116, 10 S. E. 2d 608, 614 (1940). Clark-
son, J. (dissenting), joined by Seawell and Devin, J. J., said: "It was not the inten-
tion of the court that this case should depart from the rule of reasonable pru-
dence and substitute for it a mathematical form. . . . The practice of making out
a case against the plaintiff on his evidence taken as a whole is unwarranted in an
appellate court, necessarily involving a consideration of the weight of testimony.
For the same reason it is even worse to make out a case against him upon the
defendant's evidence, however uncontradicted."
14 See note 12 supra.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141 subsection (e) was amended to provide, "that
the failure or inability of a motor vehicle operator who is operating such vehicle
within the maximum speed limits prescribed by G. S. § 20-141 (b) to stop such
vehicle within the radius of the lights thereof or within the range of his vision
shall not be considered negligence per se or contributory negligence per se in any
civil action, but the facts relating thereto may be considered with other facts
in determining the negligence or contributory negligence of such operator." See
Gantt v. Hobson, 240 N. C. 426, 82 S. E. 2d 384 (1954) where inability of
motorist to stop within the radius of his lights was held not to be insulating
negligence.
" Simpson v. Curry, 237 N. C. 260, 74 S. E. 2d 649 (1953).
1 'Goodson v. Williams, 237 N. C. 291, 74 S. E. 2d 485 (1953).
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man,' 8 Justice Holmes delivering the opinion, it was decided that be-
fore crossing a railroad track the motorist must stop, look, listen and
get out of vehicle if necessary. Six years later Pokora v. Wabash Ry
overruled the Goodman case, Justice Cardozo saying:
"If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve,
he will learn nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk
beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in
motion, the hidden train may be upon him."'u
The opinion criticized "rules artificially developed, and imposed from
without."20  The 1937 General Assembly of North Carolina-no doubt
with the Pokora case in mind-passed two statutes which provided that
failure of the motorist to stop at railroad crossings21 or to stop before
entering a main highway from a servient road22 is not to be considered
contributory negligence per se.22 In view of those two statutes and
the recent amendment to G. S. § 20-141, the North Carolina courts
should be less prone-to nonsuit plaintiffs on the ground of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
There is no simple solution to the problem. As long as we retain
the rule that certain cases are to be resolved by the court pursuant
to the single inference idea we are going to have close decisions, frus-
trated litigants, and sometimes actual violations of the jury's preroga-
tive-not to mention irreconcilable cases. One solution might be the
General Assembly's passage of a comparative negligence law, in which
event negligence would always be a jury question. 24 At least we would
have stare decisis unencumbered in that every case would go to the
jury.
As the rule of contributory negligence as a matter of law remains
in use we may as well reconcile ourselves to inconsistent and irrecon-
cilable cases. 25 At present it seems that the only thing that we can
-8275 U. S. 66 (1927). See Note, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 926 (1930).
10 292 U. S. 98, 104 (1933).
-
01d. at 105 (after giving illustrations of hazards involved in leaving the
vehicle to observe the track) : "Illustrations such as these bear witness to the
need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.
The need is more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which
the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural flowerings of be-
havior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed from
without."
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-143.22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-158.
Nonsuit of the plaintiff for failure to stop before entering a main road is
proper if plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Badders v.
Lassiter, 240 N. C. 413, 82 S. E. 2d 357 (1954).
" Note, 24 N. Z. L. J. 300 (1948) and Proposals for Legislation in. North
Carolina 11 N. C. L. REv. 51, 52 (1932).2 Those who dislike the confinement of consistency may find consoling this
quotation from Ralph Waldo Emerson: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With
19551
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do is rest each case upon its own peculiar facts and hope that a more
consistent policy will develop.26
GERALD CORBETT PARKER
Torts-Contributory Negligence-Standard of Care Required of Per-
sons under Physical Disability
In the principal case1 the plaintiff, a 76-year-old blind man, was
suing for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell on the unfinished
curbing of a street being repaired in the city of Winston-Salem. The
trial court granted a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence
because the plaintiff knew that the road was being repaired and was
thus under notice of its dangerous condition. On appeal before the
supreme court the nonsuit was affirmed.
The plaintiff in this case was nonsuited because he failed to use
due care. Just what the words due care mean in regard to any given
set of circumstances is often difficult to determine. The interpretation
becomes even more difficult when applied to circumstances involving
a person under physical disability. However, the court states in its
opinion that due care is "that standard of care which the law has
established for everybody." 2
In regard to standard of care the Restatement of Torts has this
to say:
"Unless the plaintiff is a child or an insane person, the standard
of conduct to which he should conform is the standard to which
a reasonable man would conform under like circumstances.",,
One widely accepted authority in the field of torts gives this insight
into the problem:
"The standard required of an individual is that of the sup-
posed conduct, under similar circumstances, of a hypothetical
person, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence, who repre-
consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern
himself with his shadow on the wall." THE WoRxs OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
58 (E. E. Emerson ed. 1883).
28Decisions, 14 BROOxLYN L. REv. 137, 140 (1947). Cole v. Koonce, 214
N. C. 188, 191, 198 S. E. 637, 638 (1938), cited in Note, 29 N. C. L. REv.
301, 305 (1951) in passing upon the conduct of the plaintiff and his ability,
by the exercise of due care, to avoid the consequences of defendant's negligence,
the court said: "where the factors of decisions are numerous and complicated
... and estimates of witnesses play a prominent part.., practically every case
must 'stand on its own bottom."'
' Cook v. Winston-Salem, 241 N. C. 422, 85 S. E. 2d 696 (1954).
2 Id. at 431, 85 S. E. 2d at 702.
3 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, § 464 (1) (1934).
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